La Metaphysique d'Aristote culmine dans le livre Lambda (XII). Il resume les livres precedents, puis se lance dans une fantastique description de Dieu, Premier moteur immobile de l'univers et Penser se pensant soi-meme. Le premier a nous en avoir laisse un commentaire est Themistius, au IVe siecle. Entre lui et l'epoque d'Averroes, d'Albert le Grand, de Thomas d'Aquin, rien ne nous est reste sur Lambda. Themistius paraphrase le texte et y mele de tres importantes digressions. L'original grec est (...) perdu. De la traduction arabe, nous n'avons que des fragments. Mais elle avait ete integralement traduite en hebreu. C'est a partir de ces deux sources que Remi Brague propose ici une traduction litterale, avec une introduction et des notes explicatives. (shrink)

In posteriora Aristotelis. In Physica. In libros De anima.--Pseudo-Themistius (Sophonias). In De memoria et reminiscentia. In De somno et vigilia. In De insomniis. In De divinatione per somnium.

Cet article examine une des thèses fondamentales de Thémistius dans sa paraphrase du De anima d’Aristote, c’est-à-dire le rapport entre l’intellect et ses objets, telle qu’elle figure dans la réception de deux lecteurs de Thémistius au Moyen Âge : Averroès et Thomas d’Aquin. La comparaison entre ces deux philosophes suggère que l’héritage (néo)platonicien présent dans l’interprétation thémistienne du rapport entre l’intellect et ses objets a été influent dans une certaine mesure, mais il a produit chez les deux philosophes des considérations (...) différentes. Un troisième lecteur, anonyme, est évoqué : un petit traité connu sous le nom de « Anonyme de Bâle », écrit entre 1308 et 1323, apporte un témoignage intéressant sur l’influence respective des lectures thémistiennes d’Averroès et de Thomas. (shrink)

Aristotle Middle Commentary on the Topics, comparing them, where necessary, to the testimonies collected by Boethius in his De topicis differentiis. In addition we show that the Themistian classification of loci was taken up by Abt al-Badb al-mub al-mu al-Barak thus reveals himself to be closer than Averroes to the testimony of Boethius. This suggests the idea of a double redaction by Themistius of the classification of loci: one, more concentrated, comes from an introduction to the paraphrase of the (...) central books of the Topics, which may have inspired Averroes; the other, more extensive, which will have been part of an original work, and inspired the classifications of Boethius and of Abt al-Badī. (shrink)

Bartholomaeus Arnoldi (b. c. 1465, d. September 9, 1532) (also called Usingen after his birthplace), began as a philosopher in the via moderna school and later became a member and a theologian of the Order of Augustinian Hermits. Together with Jodocus Trutfetter, he was the most prominent philosopher in Erfurt in the early sixteenth century. Usingen’s main authorities were John Buridan, William of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Peter of Ailly, and Gabriel Biel. The focus of his teaching was on (...) a “common view of the via moderna,” which was strongly involved in semantic–metaphysical questions. Usingen stressed the importance of logic as a necessary tool for gaining scientific knowledge, but it was his works on natural philosophy, in particular, that were respected by his contemporaries. In natural philosophy, he generally followed the tradition of Buridan. His discussion on the theory of supposition follows Ockham. On the relationship between theology and philosophy, he strongly posited the unity of truth by allowing certain theological truths a sufficient degree of plausibility as truths in natural philosophy. This view was partly based on Lawrence of Lindores. (shrink)

In the rhetorical tradition of Late Antiquity, Socrates’ legend has a good fortune in the works of different rhetoricians and philosophers. In the following pages I am going to deal with some examples of this phaenomenon, through the works of Themistius and Julian the emperor : two intellectuals of the IV century who are, under many aspects, the exact opposites.They both try to ‘actualize’ Socrates’ figure, highlighting different aspects of the Athenian philosopher, on the grounds of their personal purposes (...) of self-advertisement. So Themistius, a skilled politician working as princeps’ advisor, sees in Socrates a symbol of the ‘politikos philosophos’, who speaks plainly in public with people of all ranks, in a simple and direct way ; for Julian, emperor and philosopher of the new Hellenism, Socrates, instead, is mainly the saviour of the souls, addressing all men towards the true knowledge of themselves and the true faith in pagan gods. These portraits are complementary and both attest the ability of Late Antique intellectuals in their imitatio/aemulatio of figures and myths of Classical Antiquity. (shrink)

This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep, but as yet almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle's syllogistic and the Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between Aristotle's metasyllogistic equimodality condition and truth-conditions for third type conditionals. In fact, as is shown in §1, Aristotle's condition amounts to introducing in his metasyllogistic a non-truthfunctional implicational arrow '', the truth-conditions of which turn out to be logically equivalent to truth-conditions of third type conditionals, according to which only the impossible follows from the (...) impossible. Moreover, Aristotle is given precisely this non-Scotian conditional logic in two so far overlooked passages of Themistius' Paraphrasis of De Caelo. Some further consequences of Aristotle's equimodality condition on his logic, and notably on his syllogistic, are pointed out and discussed at length. A extension of Aristotle's condition is also discussed, along with a full characterization of truth-conditions of fourth type conditionals. (shrink)

L’article revient, à la lumière de Brentano, sur l’«esthétique» d’Aristote. Si Aristote a insisté sur la manière dont la perception suppose la donation d’un perceptible existant à l’extérieur, il semble qu’il est aussi fait droit à ce qu’aurait de spécifique le percept, en tant qu’il constituerait un objet perçu interne à l’âme. Il faut dès lors revenir sur la passivité que constituerait la sensation, et insister sur l’activité perceptive de l’âme en tant qu’elle vise, déjà dans la sensation, un objet (...) mental. Une telle lecture «brentanienne» d’Aristote se trouve déjà annoncée par l’interprétation de la doctrine de la connaissance aristotélicienne que l’on trouve chez les commentateurs grecs, Thémistius et Philopon notamment. (shrink)

Die Philosophie des Barockscotismus war einerseits durch die rückwärtsgewandte Anknüpfung an den mittelalterlichen Denker Johannes Duns Scotus, andererseits durch die Anknüpfung an die Entwicklung in der zeitgenössischen Scholastik, vor allem der Jesuitenscholastik, geprägt. Welche Art von Metaphysik hat diese besondere philosophiehistorische Konstellation hervorgebracht? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, analysiert die vorliegende Arbeit das Metaphysikwerk des wichtigsten Repräsentanten des frühneuzeitlichen Scotismus, Bartholomaeus Mastrius (1602-1673); sie erschließt außerdem eine Vielzahl von kaum bis gar nicht erforschten Metaphysikwerken aus der Franziskanerscholastik des 17. (...) und 18. Jahrhunderts. Das eigenartige, erstaunliche Vielfalt einschließende Profil einer in Vergessenheit geratenen philosophischen Tradition wird deutlich. Durch den Fokus auf ein philosophiehistorisches Phänomen außerhalb des Mainstreams leistet die Arbeit einen Beitrag zu einer differenzierteren Sichtweise der intellektuellen Kultur der europäischen Frühmoderne. Baroque-age Scotist philosophy was, on the one hand, characterised by recourse to the Medieval thinker John Duns Scotus and, on the other hand, by an adaptation to trends in contemporary scholasticism, first of all that of the Jesuits. What kind of metaphysics did this particular constellation within the history of philosophy produce? In order to answer this question, the present book analyses the work on metaphysics by the most important representative of early modern Scotism, Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673). In addition, the book investigates a multitude of scarcely or never studied works on metaphysics from the Franciscan scholastic tradition of the 17th and 18th centuries. The peculiar profile of a forgotten philosophical tradition with its astonishing plurality becomes apparent. By focusing on a phenomenon from the history of philosophy outside the mainstream, this work contributes to a more differentiated view on the intellectual culture in early modern Europe. (shrink)

Über die Datierung der vierten Rede des Themistius sowie ihr zeitliches Verhältnis zur dritten Rede besteht in der Forschung keine Einigkeit. Verschiedene Termine zwischen dem Winter 355/356 und dem Winter 358/359 sind dabei vorgeschlagen worden. An der nunmehr fast einhundert Jahre alten Diskussion fällt auf, daß die jeweils ins Feld geführten Argumente nahezu ausschließlich auf den Text der Rede bezogen sind. Weitgehend unbeachtet geblieben ist hingegen der Zusammenhang der Datierungsfrage von or. 4 mit der Antiochiareise des Themistius im (...) Jahre 356 und den hierzu gehörigen Libaniusbriefen, darunter insbesondere ep. 551. Im Folgenden soll daher versucht werden, anhand der Frage, wo sich Themistius zwischen dem Sommer 356 und dem Sommer 357 aufgehalten hat, Licht in die Datierungsproblematik zu bringen. (shrink)

L’auteur met en évidence la façon dont Thémistius, dans sa paraphrase, réorganise les parties du texte des lignes 71a17-b8 des Seconds Analytiques. Par une analyse détaillée du propos d’Aristote dans ces lignes, il montre que la réorganisation proposée par Thémistius est fidèle à l’esprit du texte aristotélicien, et s’appuie vraisemblablement sur des indices externes dont disposait le paraphraste.

This article sheds new light on Themistius’ argument in what is philosophically the most original section of his extant work, namely On Aristotle's On the Soul 100.16–109.3: here, Themistius offers a systematic interpretation of Aristotle's ‘agent’ intellect and its ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ counterparts. A solution to two textual difficulties at 101.36–102.2 is proposed, supported by the Arabic translation. This allows us to see that Themistius engages at length with a Platonizing reading of the enigmatic final lines of (...) De anima III.5, where Aristotle explains ‘why we do not remember’. This Platonizing reading can be safely identified with the one developed in a fragmentary text extant only in Arabic under the title Porphyry's treatise On the soul. While Themistius rejects this reading, he turns out to be heavily influenced by the author's interpretation of the ‘agent’, ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ intellect. These findings offer us a new glimpse into Themistius’ philosophical programme: he is searching for an alternative to both the austere Aristotelianism of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the all too Platonizing reading of Aristotle adopted by thinkers such as Porphyry. (shrink)

Themistius's (ca. 317–ca. 388 C.E.) paraphrase of the De Anima is an influential and important work; however, it is not now regarded as profound or original and thereby suffers from neglect. I argue that Themistius is misunderstood on the matter of Aristotle's productive and potential intellects. It is commonly held that Themistius gives to the productive intellect the role of illuminating images in order to produce universal thoughts in the potential intellect with epistemic certainty. I argue that (...) Themistius's productive intellect does not transform images to reveal the forms contained therein, but gives to the potential intellect the ability, first, to organize our sense-experiences in the course of acquiring rudimentary universal concepts and, then, to discover the forms of things by ordinary discursive thinking. (shrink)

Aquinas puts forward two different, and conflicting, interpretations of Themistius’s account of the intellect. In his earlier interpretation of Themistius, Aquinas understands him to hold the position that both the possible and agent intellect are separate and incorruptible, existing apart from individual human souls but shared in by individual souls in the process of knowing. In De unitate intellectus contra averroistas, however, Aquinas radically departs from this reading, hailing Themistius as a genuine interpreter of the Peripatetic position, (...) while decrying Averroes’s perversion of both Themistius and Aristotle. This paper examines these competing interpretations of Themistius’s account of the intellect in his Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle, focusing on two issues central to its interpretation: (1) the nature of intellect insofar as it is separate, impassive, and unmixed, and (2) whether the productive intellect is one or many. (shrink)

An English translation of Pierre Bayle's posthumous last book, Entretiens de Maxime et de Themiste (1707), in which Bayle defends his skeptical position on the problem of the evil. This book is often cited and attacked by G.W. Leibniz in his Theodicy (1710). Over one hundred pages of original philosophical and historical material introduce the translation, providing it with context and establishing the work's importance.

Les interprétations et traductions habituelles de l’affirmation d’Aristote en Métaphysique Λ, 1075b12-13 πάντες δ᾽ οἱ τἀναντία λέγοντες οὐ χρῶνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐὰν μὴ ῥυθμίσῃ τις se fondent sur une compréhension contestable de la signification du verbe ῥυθμίζω. Une brève analyse de la signification et de l’usage du verbe au ve et ive siècle av. J.-C., ainsi qu’une étude des principaux interprètes anciens et médiévaux (le Ps.-Alexandre, Thomas d’Aquin, Averroès, Thémistius), dévoilent les difficultés que la compréhension de ce passage d’Aristote suscitaient (...) dès l’Antiquité et permettent de supposer que ῥυθμίζω doit ici être entendu dans son sens technique, métaphysique (« former », « ajouter une forme »), selon un usage que l’on trouve aussi chez Démocrite et Antiphon. La compréhension correcte de ce verbe autorise alors à présenter une nouvelle interprétation de ce bref passage d’Aristote et d’y découvrir une critique plus complète et précise des thèses qu’il entend dénoncer. (shrink)

Une analyse minutieusen du XXVIe discours de Thémistius, philosophe néo-platonicien et commentateur des œuvres d'Aristote qui fonda une école de philosophie à Constantinople vers 345 ap. J.-C., a fait découvrir à l'auteur qu'il s'agit d'une œuvre d'un socratique du IVe siècle av. J.-C. Ce discours aurait été écrit contre a l conception de la rhétorique exposée par Platon dans le Phédre. Thémistius non seulement s'en serait inspiré, mais I'aurait copié d'un bout à l'autre. Dans un ouvrage antérieur l'auteur avait suggéré (...) le nom d'Antisthfène. Les critiques de E. De Strycker l'ont fait reculer. Dans cet ouvrage, il laisse tomber le nom d'Antisthène pour se rallier à un socratique anonyme, adversaire de Platon. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Timothée de Milet: le poète et le musicien by Gérard LambinPauline A. LeVenGérard Lambin. Timothée de Milet: le poète et le musicien. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013. 212pp. Paper, €16.The image on the cover of Gérard Lambin’s monograph, Timothée de Milet: le poète et le musicien, is a Moreau painting entitled “Dead Poet Carried by a Centaur.” This illustration can be regarded as a programmatic statement for (...) the claim made on the jacket: to make the late fifth-century b.c.e. lyricist, Timotheus of Miletus, come out of the shadows by “offer[ing] the most complete synthesis about an author who had remained unknown for a long time and set[ting] him in his poetic and musical universe.” The book is the first monograph in French devoted exclusively to Timotheus and the first original publication in French on the topic since 1904 (the year that saw a flurry of articles in the wake of the discovery of the papyrus of Timotheus’ Persians in 1903 and the publication of its editio princeps by Wilamowitz). Lambin’s study is composed of two parts: the first presents aspects of the biography of Timotheus and features of the so-called “New Music”; the second describes Timotheus’ poetic and musical output. While sections of the second part offer some of the most sensitive and refreshing pieces of literary criticism I have read on Timotheus’ poetry, the first part, and especially the first chapter, is much less satisfying, as one would wish to see Lambin engage more with methodological problems.“The Man and his Oeuvre” (chap. 1) sounds at first deliciously quaint: it opens with the Suda entry devoted to Timotheus and continues with a compilation of ancient testimonies about the poet (most of them available in the testimonia part of the fifth volume of Campbell’s Loeb edition of Greek Lyric Poetry). Lambin presents a dossier of biographical snippets plucked from ancient authors ranging from Timotheus’ fifth-century b.c.e. contemporaries (Pherecrates) to fourth-century c.e. authors (Themistius), and evaluates their verisimilitude, without clearly defining his criteria for adoption or rejection. The whole chapter synthesizes these short extracts (with accessible and elegant translations) into [End Page 361] a complete, cohesive account of the life of the poet and the era he lived in. The narrative gets particularly vivid at times, and the reader is pleasantly led to fantasize about the world of Timotheus: “protected, admired, rid of all material care, Timotheus must have known in Pella one of the happiest periods of his life, far from the conservatism of a certain elite, for whom the New Music represented everything that was bad about democracy, but also far from the cat-calls and jokes from an Athenian public too quick to mock him” (13). It is clear that Lambin likes his author and wants to provide the reader with a vibrant picture of a flesh-and-bones poet.But once the charm of the historical fiction wears out, Lambin’s cursory analysis of the testimonia is likely to frustrate readers trained to regard ancient “biographical” notices with a healthy dose of skepticism. Take the case of the anecdote from Plutarch (14–15), describing the relationship between Timotheus and King Archelaos: “As Timotheus, the citharode, who had received less than he had hoped, reproached [Archelaos] openly and alluded to the situation by singing the following line: ‘you promise (aineis) earth-born silver,’ Archelos replied ‘and you ask’ (aiteis) for it.” Lambin (deftly translating the pun in Greek with the paronomasia promets / promeuts) comments on the contrast between the situation of Timotheus and that of poets who lived “before the Muse, as Pindar says, became mercenary.” The vague reference to the Pindaric expression is not helpful, however, as it oversimplifies the issue by assimilating two different times and sets of economic conditions (Pindar’s, composing for private patrons, and Timotheus’, composing for public competitions or communities). Moreover, no interpretation is given of the way Plutarch engages with the anecdotal topos of the poet’s relationship with money: one only has to think about the many anecdotes about the cheapskate... (shrink)

Wenn bei einem neuplatonischen Philosophen, der sein Leben als Bischof beendet hat, von „Bekehrung“ die Rede ist, denkt man wohl an die Hinwendung zum Christentum. Dies ist in vorliegender Habilitationsschrift ebensowenig gemeint wie die vorhergehende „conversion“ (Bregman) des Synesios zur Philosophie durch Hypatia. Vielmehr geht es um eine „Neubestimmung dessen, was er für einen angemessenen Lebenswandel hielt“ im Jahre 405: nämlich die „dezidierte Abkehr von dem ehrgeizigen Projekt, als Themistius redivivus zu reüssieren“ (713). Schmitt entdeckt „einen bislang in der (...) Forschung immer geleugneten tiefgreifenden Bruch in der Biographie des Kyrenäers“ (59). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 122-123 [Access article in PDF] Andreas Kamp. Philosophiehistorie als Rezeptionsgeschichte. Die Reaktion auf Aristoteles' De Anima-Noetik. Der frühe Hellenismus. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 2001. Pp. viii + 315. Cloth, $82.00. This book is the first installment of an extraordinarily ambitious project. The plan is to investigate the reception of Aristotle's conception of the intellect, set out in De Anima 3.4-5, in (...) the subsequent history of philosophy, from Theophrastus to the present.The current volume deals with the natural starting-point for this project, philosophy in the early Hellenistic period, centering on Theophrastus and his tenure as head of the Peripatos, the school that Aristotle founded.Kamp begins with an engaging, somewhat lengthy introduction, which remains curiously remote from what one might expect it to concentrate on, namely Aristotle's conception of the intellect. Apart from presenting an outline of the reception of Aristotle's philosophical work in general from Theophrastus to Sigmund Freud, the introduction includes only one short paragraph specifically on the topic of the intellect (12). This paragraph, which comes closest to revealing Kamp's reason for focusing, of all things, on Aristotle's discussion of the intellect in De Anima3.4-5, simply makes two unsubstantiated claims. First, Kamp claims that the conception of the intellect, as presented in those chapters, is at the center of the Aristotelian system; and secondly, that this is, of all Aristotelian and perhaps all philosophical theories, the one that received the highest level of attention in the subsequent history of philosophy. The reader might be content to wait and let the second claim be borne out, in the present volume and beyond; but the first claim—concerning the centrality of the intellect, and of De Anima3.4-5, to Aristotle's thought—should at least have received some specification and illustration.The central part of the book, and philosophically by far the most interesting, concerns Theophrastus. Kamp begins with an extensive discussion of the political, social, and economic circumstances of Theophrastus's biography and of the history of the Peripatos. He then offers a reconstruction of Theophrastus's remarks on the nature of the intellect in the fifth book of his Physics. This reconstructive effort is based on a number of fragments [End Page 122] preserved in Themistius's De Anima paraphrase (written at about 350ad) and in Priscianus Lydus's Metaphrasis in Theophrastum (about 530ad). Kamp's discussion of these fragments is well informed, judicious, and illuminating throughout.It may be in order, though, to indicate one misgiving. One of the problems that Theophrastus addresses is that it might appear as if thinking were a matter of the intellect being changed by intelligibles, much as perceiving is, or may appear to be, a matter of sense being changed by sensibles. (If so, the question arises as to what the principle of thought is, the intellect itself or the intelligibles.) Kamp reconstructs the train of thought as follows (124-5).(1) The intellect stands to intelligibles the way sense stands to sensibles (intellect-sense analogy).(2) Sense is changed by sensibles.Therefore, the intellect is changed by intelligibles.Kamp proceeds to suggest (126) that Theophrastus attempted to avoid the conclusion by denying the first premise. According to Kamp, Theophrastus rejected the intellect-sense analogy by drawing attention to significant differences between (the activity of) the intellect and sense perception, one of these being that the intellect (in thinking) is changed only in a special sense, namely inasmuch as it undergoes a transition to activity, energeia. Kamp is right that the notion of a special kind of change that consists in a transition to activity is Aristotelian; it is presented in considerable detail in De Anima2.5 (417b2-16). But it would surely be puzzling if Theophrastus thought that one significant difference between (the activity of) the intellect and sense perception was that the intellect (in thinking) was changed in a special sense (whereas sense perception, to complete the... (shrink)